Why did Countries Adopt the Gold Standard? Lessons from Japan by Kris James Mitchener et al.
 
Why did Countries Adopt the Gold Standard? 




Kris James Mitchener 





Marc D. Weidenmier 
Claremont McKenna College and NBER 
 
 




Why did policymakers adopt the gold standard? Although previous research has 
identified ex post effects of gold standard adoption on trade and bond yields, few studies 
have sought to understand whether these were the actual outcomes of interest to 
policymakers at the time of adoption. We examine Japan’s adoption of the gold standard 
in 1897 to understand both the ex ante motives policymakers gave for wanting to go onto 
the gold standard and the ex post effects of gold standard adoption. By focusing on 
multiple outcome variables that were of interest to contemporaries, we are able to shed 
light on the political economy of the adoption of fixed exchange rates. In contrast to 
previous studies examining bond yields, we find little evidence that joining the gold 
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Why did Countries Adopt the Gold Standard? 
Lessons from Japan 
 
 
Why did countries join the gold standard? Recent research in economic history 
has generally focused on two explanations. Bordo and Rockoff (1996) argue that 
adherence to the monetary rule was “a good housekeeping seal of approval,” which 
signaled to international capital markets that countries were committed to pursuing 
prudent monetary and fiscal policies.
1 Investors rewarded countries that joined the gold 
standard by lowering their cost of capital in financial markets by approximately 30 basis 
points (Obstfeld and Taylor, 2003). Another explanation for joining the gold standard 
focuses on the importance of fixed exchange rates in facilitating international trade. 
Flandreau and Maurel (2005) and Meissner and Lopez-Cordova (2003) provide evidence 
that the gold standard increased bilateral trade flows between 50 and 100 percent during 
the period 1870-1913. These studies argue that the hard peg promoted international trade 
perhaps by reducing transaction costs or exchange-rate volatility.
2 
  To date, most empirical studies have analyzed the effects of gold standard 
adoption on a single outcome variable, such as trade or government borrowing costs.
3 
While partial equilibrium studies allow one to correlate economic outcomes with the 
adoption of a hard peg, they fail to give insight into why a country chose to go on the 
gold standard. Ex post evidence of lower borrowing costs or increased trade suggests 
                                                 
1 Flandreau and Zumer (2005) and Ferguson and Schularick (2006a, 2006b) provide evidence that the gold 
standard did not reduce the cost of capital during the gold standard period using a large sample of countries 
along with additional control variables in their regressions. 
2 The precise mechanism is not specified. 
3 Meissner (2005), is an exception, in that he considers multiple factors that affected a country’s decision 
about when to adopt the gold standard. However, he is primarily concerned with the process of gold 
standard diffusion rather than the political economy of adoption, and does not explicitly consider why 
countries adopted and how the decision to adopt then impacted economic outcomes such as borrowing cost, 
investment, and trade flows.  2   
 
correlation, but not motivation. To understand why countries would willingly choose to 
tie the hands of their monetary authorities and join the gold standard, it is necessary to 
examine the policy debates at the time of adoption, and then test whether adoption had 
the intended effect or unintended consequences.  
In this paper, we argue that examining countries on a case-by-case basis can 
provide better insight into understanding why countries adopt hard pegs such as the gold 
standard. By focusing on the experience of a single country, we are able to link 
contemporaneous policy arguments to multiple outcomes and avoid the post hoc ergo 
propter hoc fallacy that plagues the cross-country literature. We focus on Japan’s 
adoption of the gold standard in 1897 for three reasons. First, late nineteenth-century 
Japan has many of the characteristics of today’s emerging market economies: it was a 
small open economy with an expanding trade sector and a desire to borrow in 
international capital markets. Examining Japan’s experience may help us better 
understand the decision making of countries that adopt hard pegs today. Second, Japan’s 
historical archives provide detailed information on the political economy of gold standard 
adoption and the role of special interest groups in the decision making process. 
Furthermore, primary source materials from the nineteenth century also permit us to 
collect high frequency price and yield data on domestic stocks and bonds as well as 
annual data on bilateral trade flows that can be used to test the economic effects of gold 
standard adoption. Third, previous researchers have argued that Japan is the canonical 
case of an emerging market borrower benefiting from lower borrowing costs after 
adoption of a hard peg. For example, Sussman and Yafeh’s (2000, 2006) find that 
sovereign risk fell by approximately 200 basis points when Japan joined the gold club. 3   
 
Using a more complete database of Japanese sovereign debt and domestic debt issues, we 
are able to re-assess whether borrowing rates actually fell after adoption.  
Our empirical analysis suggests a revised interpretation for why Japan adopted the 
gold standard and what effects its adoption had on the economy. Although some 
participants in the parliamentary debates suggested that Japan would benefit from lower 
rates of borrowing, we find that, after Japan adopted the gold standard, its rates of 
borrowing in both international and domestic capital markets did not fall. Nor do we find 
evidence of a domestic investment boom in the wake of gold standard adoption.  
Japanese policymakers of the nineteenth century also suggested that going onto 
gold would affect trade, but they were decidedly mixed as to whether it would increase it 
or reduce it. We find that both the opponents of adopting (who argued that Japan was 
receiving large benefits from being on silver) and proponents (who argued Japan would 
benefit from lower transactions costs and exchange rate volatility) were correct. 
Estimates from a gravity model of bilateral trade suggest that Japan received a large boost 
in trade when Japan and its partners were on the silver standard. However, gold standard 
adoption also significantly boosted trade, even after controlling for other factors. As it 
turns out, Japan was lucky. It went onto gold at precisely the time when the rate of silver 
depreciation against gold began to significantly decline.   
  The next section of the paper provides a brief discussion of the events leading up 
to Japan’s decision to go on the gold standard and the debates among Japanese 
policymakers over the adoption of the gold standard. Section III examines evidence from 
bond markets in both London and Tokyo to analyze the impact of gold-standard adoption 
on sovereign yield spreads. Section IV employs a gravity model to assess the impact of 4   
 
adopting the gold standard on bilateral trade flows. Section V explores whether Japan 
experienced an investment boom after gold standard adoption. Section VI discusses the 
implications of our results for hard pegs and for the financial history of the Meiji period. 
 
II. The Decision to Adopt Gold 
 
  During the Meiji period, Japan parted ways with its feudal past and began to forge 
a new national identity for its economy. It turned outward in its orientation (initially 
induced by the “gunboat diplomacy” of Western powers), developing industries and 
trading companies that sold products such as silk in overseas markets and borrowing 
internationally to fund internal improvements that would facilitate the movement of 
goods and people.
4  
At the same time Japan was forging a national economy, it was experimenting 
with institutions that would foster economic growth and stability. It introduced a national 
currency, the yen, in 1871. It imported the U.S. model of a national banking system in 
1872, and in 1876, allowed these national banks to issue paper notes backed by 
government bonds. These early monetary institutions resulted in unsustainably high 
inflation rates in the late 1870s and early 1880s, and paved the way for the Japanese 
government to centralize control over the money supply. The Bank of Japan was founded 
in 1882, and thereafter, it began issuing convertible notes that hastened the demise of 
commercial bank note issuance. Japan adopted the silver standard in May 1885 and had 
made all yen-denominated paper money issued by the government convertible to silver 
by January 1886. The country stayed on the silver standard for eleven years. 
                                                 
4 Its first national debt, issued in London in 1870 financed railway construction. 5   
 
  Beginning in 1893, the government began preparation to join the gold standard. 
The veteran finance minister, Count Masayoshi Matsukata, initiated the program
5. The 
government formed the Committee on the Monetary System to explore what monetary 
system would be best for Japan’s economy in the long run. The committee was charged 
with determining the global causes of gold-silver price fluctuations and their 
consequences on the Japanese economy and recommending the monetary standard that 
would be best suited for Japan. As finance minister, Kunitake Watanabe, stated in setting 
up the committee, “Fluctuations in the price of gold and silver are having significant 
effects on the Japanese economy and fiscal conditions. I propose to set the committee on 
the monetary system…and the government will refer to it for building its strategy on 
monetary matters.”  
After seven general meetings and 41 task force meetings, the committee 
submitted its final report to the returning and reappointed finance minister Matsukata, on 
July 3, 1895. Only one of the seven task force members, the protégé of Matsukata, 
insisted on an immediate move to the gold standard. Of the 15 members on the main 
committee (composed of government officials, business leaders, and academics), seven 
wanted to retain silver, six suggested moving to gold at some point in the future, and two 
desired a bimetallic standard. Most of the supporters of gold standard adoption were 
bureaucrats and politicians with close relationships to Matsukata whereas opponents were 
largely business leaders and academics. Despite the tepid response by the committee, 
Matsukata continued to press for monetary reform, and was emboldened to do so once 
China was forced to pay a large indemnity to Japan at the conclusion of the Sino-
                                                 
5 Matsukata played a central role in implementing the monetary and financial reforms of the Meiji era. As 
an official of Ministry of Finance, he helped to engineer the fiscal stabilization program of the 1870s. As 
Finance Minister, he also initiated the movement to establish the central bank, the Bank of Japan. 6   
 
Japanese War in 1895. Matsukata’s strategy was to request that China pay the indemnity 
in pound-sterling in London even though the original treaty stated it would be paid in 
silver taels. The pound sterling would then enable Japan to acquire gold reserves so that it 
could move onto the gold standard.  
After two years’ preparation for introducing the gold standard, including 
acquisition of gold reserves in overseas markets, in March of 1897, the ruling 
government (led by Matsukata, who had been both Prime Minister and Finance Minister 
since September 1896) officially submitted legislation to the Imperial Diet authorizing a 
gold standard.  
Once the bill was introduced, fierce debate erupted in the legislative branch of the 
Japanese government. Although a relatively new political institution, the Japanese 
Imperial Diet of the 1890s served as a counterweight to the Prime Minister-led positions 
of the Emperor’s ruling government (Muramatsu, Ito, and Tsujinaka, 2001, p.82).
6 
During the 1890s, the Diet routinely rejected and cut the budget prepared by the ruling 
government, including military projects. In contrast, the military was not a major political 
player until at least the end of the Russo-Japanese War (1904-5).
7 
National legislators such as Atsushi Kawashima, a member of Giin Kurabu 
[Assembly Members’ Club], a political faction that supported the ruling government 
backed Matsukata’s position, and made spirited arguments in favor of adoption.
8  For 
                                                 
6 Under the Meiji Constitution of 1889, the first national election of House of Representatives (the Lower 
House) was held in July 1890. The first Diet session was in November 1890. Prime Ministers were 
appointed by the Emperor with the consultation to Senators (Genro), or veterans of Meiji Restoration of 
1868.  
7 Harada [2007], pp.34-42. 
8 Atsushi Kawashima (1847-1911) was a member of House of Representatives. His career demonstrates 
close ties with Matsukata. He was born in Kagoshima, the same prefecture as Matsukata. He had served in 
the Ministry of Finance before being elected from his home region in the first national election in 1890. He 
was a member of the previous Committee on the Monetary System, and. he supported the gold standard 7   
 
example, Kawashima argued that the “financial credibility would be improved.” He 
opined that it would not only enhance Japan’s military power and domestic economy, but 
it would stabilize Japanese finances. Japan’s yen-based payments would not be subject to 
exchange-rate risk. Kawashima suggested that adopting gold would enhance foreign 
investors’ credit on Japanese government debts and help Japan attract foreign capital at 
reduced rates. He argued cheap and affluent foreign capital could be used to build up a 
stronger military and promote domestic business activities.
9  
Legislative proponents also argued that going on gold would enhance trade. For 
example, Kawashima commented that “to compete with other countries in the trade 
sphere, we must have the common world currency as others do…The gold standard is 
beneficial for the development of commerce and industries. Japan’s main trading partners 
are the gold-standard countries.”
10  Ministry of Finance officials had drawn similar 
conclusions in the 1895 report, arguing that “many of the once-famous silver standard 
countries such as Mexico…have already moved to the gold standard. These trends 
indicate the natural course for Japan in financial and economic spheres” (Sakatani, 
Appendix to Final Report of the Committee).
11 
In addition to the benefits arising from what are now referred to as network 
externalities, Kawashima suggested that gold standard adoption would reduce exchange 
rate volatility for countries sharing the same monetary standard as well as currency risk. 
                                                                                                                                                 
upon the voting on the committee’s final report. During the debate in the Diet in 1897, he belonged to a 
political fraction named Assembly Members’ Club (Giin Kurabu), which supported the ruling government. 
In June 1897, two months after the passage of the bills introducing the gold standard, he resigned to 
become the first Governor of Japan Hypothec Bank (Nihon Kangyo Ginko), which was also established 
under Matsukata’s leadership. 
9.Imperial Diet (1897), reprinted in Bank of Japan (1960  pp.133-134). Other policymakers, however, 
suggested this was unnecessary as Japan could simply issue debt denominated in gold. 
10 Imperial Diet (1897} reprinted in Bank of Japan (1960, p.135). 
11 Committee on the Monetary System (1895) reprinted in Bank of Japan (1957, p.901). 8   
 
“Japan has suffered from fluctuations in domestic prices induced by exchange rate 
fluctuations. The price fluctuations induced by exchange rate fluctuations will disappear 
under the gold standard. Foreign banks have got substantial premium on foreign 
exchange transactions of Japanese companies. The Japanese companies do not have to 
pay such premium once we introduce the gold standard. Foreign buyers of Japanese 
products will request the products more if the prices of the products are stable under the 
gold standard.”
12   Similarly, Juichi Soeda, Counselor of the Ministry of Finance, 
concluded: “Unless we could remove the exchange rate risk, we could not expect proper 
development of Japanese foreign trade.”
13 
Proponents of the gold standard suggested that adoption might also lead to an 
investment boom: “If we introduce the gold standard, foreign capital will invest in the 
Japanese markets and buy Japanese government bonds and private securities, and the 
Japanese commerce and industries will be booming.”
14 
In introducing the authorizing legislation, Matsukata summed up the Cabinet’s 
position: “First, fluctuations of prices will be smaller under the gold standard than under 
the silver standard. Second, the introduction of the gold standard will promote trade, 
especially with other gold standard countries. Third, the introduction of the gold standard 
will reduce exchange rate risk with gold standard currencies. Fourth, the gold standard 
will connect the Japanese financial market to overseas markets. As our country has been 
                                                 
12 Imperial Diet (1897) reprinted in Bank of Japan (1960, p.135). 
13 Imperial Diet (1897)reprinted in Bank of Japan (1960, p.158). 
14 Comments of Atsushi Kawashima. Imperial Diet (1897), reprinted in Bank of Japan (1960, p.136). 9   
 
developing, we need more communication with overseas financial markets. Fifth, the 
introduction of the gold standard will benefit public finance.”
15 
While the proponents of going onto the gold standard had the powerful backing of 
Matsukata and the Ministry of Finance, many other legislators believed that adopting the 
gold standard would hurt the Japanese economy and that the timing was not propitious. 
They noted that the majority opinion of the 1895 report had concluded that recent 
fluctuations in the gold-silver price (while Japan was on the silver standard) had 
increased the volume of exports, reduced the burdens of debtors and fixed-tax payers, 
created a boom in agriculture, and led to prosperity in commerce and industry. As Eiichi 
Shibusawa, one member of the 1895 committee and a prominent business leader, wrote: 
“The exports to gold standard countries increased by more than 260 percent from 1878 to 
1893 while the imports from these countries only increased by 70 percent over the same 
period. This is because the price of exports has fallen while the price of imports has risen. 
This has promoted the development of industries, technical progress, and growth in the 
demand for labor. These benefits exceed the costs of being a silver standard country.” 
(Shibusawa, Appendix to Final Report).
 16 
In the late 19
th century, Emperor Meiji set national goals of “bringing more 
wealth to the nation, and building a stronger military (fukoku kyouhei).” Business leaders 
                                                 
15 Speech of Finance Minister Court Masayoshi Matsukata. Ministry of Finance (1905, pp.182-183). 
Matsukata may have also believed that adopting gold would increase the prestige and standing of Japan 
internationally, and that it was broadly consistent with the national goals of modernizing Japan’s economy 
and military. 
16 Eiichi Shibusawa (1840-1931) was born into a family that was involved in sericulture located near Tokyo. 
After the Meiji Restration, he joined Ministry of Finance and drafted the legislation to introduce a single 
unit of currency, the yen, and to establish the National Banking system. When he left the government in 
1873 he established and/or run a number of Japan’s leading companies, including First National Bank, Oji 
Paper, Osaka Spinning, Kanegafuchi Spinning, Tokio Marine Insurance, Nippon Yusen (NYK Line), Japan 
Railway, and the Tokyo Stock Exchange. He chaired Tokyo Chamber of Commerce from 1878 to 1905 and 
often represented the viewpoints of the business community in national political debates. In Japan, he has 
been referred to as “Father of Japanese Capitalism.” 10   
 
such as Eiichi Shibusawa argued that staying on silver would be consistent with those 
goals. Shibusawa wrote, “The effects of the recent fluctuation in parity of gold and silver 
are quite beneficial to our economy in general under the current monetary system. 
Japanese exports to gold standard countries have increased more than imports from them. 
This is because the price of exported goods falls, while the price of imported goods 
increases. This has promoted development of industries, import substitution of many 
products, technical progress, growth in the demand for labor, and expanded national 
wealth. These benefits exceed the costs of being a silver standard country. If Japan 
introduces the gold standard, prices would fall, and business conditions would deteriorate, 
affecting the economy and society badly.” (Shibusawa, Appendix to Final Report).  
Based on data from the 1890s, Japan’s exports were concentrated in a few key 
commodities and industries. 41 percent of Japanese exports were silk products, and 27 
percent were tea, rice, and matches.
17 The value added of these commodities was almost 
entirely domestic, and Japanese producers of these goods had realized significant benefits 
from the depreciation of the silver yen against gold-standard currencies. Indeed, the 
majority of industrial and commercial sector lobbied to stay on a silver standard. Writing 
in the Quarterly Journal of Economics in 1898, economist Garrett Droppers wrote the 
following about the business community’s view on Japan’s monetary standard: “From 
1886 to 1897, a period of over a decade, it is doubtful whether there was the slightest 
demand for return to the gold standard. On the contrary, every so-called decline of silver 
was hailed with general satisfaction by those engaged in industrial and commercial 
pursuits.”
18 
                                                 
17 Figures are average shares of exports based on data from 1893-1897.  
18 Droppers (1898, p.164) 11   
 
In contrast to exports, there was no single import that accounted for a large 
portion of total imports. Raw cotton accounted for 19 percent, sugar for 10 percent, 
machinery for 9 percent, and petroleum for 4 percent. Given that imports were used as 
inputs into a variety of products or were final goods sold to consumers, it may have been 
more difficult for policymakers to drum up support from the business community to 
jettison the silver standard, since no one industry was experiencing a disproportionate rise 
in input prices (due to the depreciation of silver). 
Political opponents of the gold standard allied themselves with the business 
community to attack the government’s plan. For example, Kungoro Shigeoka of the 
opposition Liberal Party argued that Japan’s export industries would be hurt since the 
price of silver had been declining relative to gold while Japan was on the silver standard. 
He reasoned that the increase in exports outweighed the costs of exchange-rate volatility: 
“Although fluctuations in gold-silver exchange rates might induce some inconvenience 
for foreign trade, the advantages in competitiveness for the silver standard surpass the 
inconvenience effect.”
19 Shigeoka also maintained that adoption of gold would commit 
Japan to persistent trade deficits driven by cheap imports and expensive exports (due to 
gold’s appreciation relative to silver). Ironically, it was the export boom during the silver 
standard that may have enabled Japan to go onto the gold standard. According to Miller 
(2007), export revenues during the period of silver deflation enabled the Imperial Navy of 
Japan to purchase British cruisers, defeat China in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5, and 
acquire the indemnity payable in gold, which enabled Japan to go onto the gold standard.  
                                                 
19 The great Meiji era entrepreneur Shibusawa Eiichi also argued that Japanese businesses had benefited 
immensely from cheaper exports during the silver standard; he became the flag bearer of the business 
community’s opposition to gold standard adoption (Metzler, 2006, p.30). In contrast, the Ministry of 
Finance argued that the benefits to trade and industry were only temporary. 12   
 
In addition, Shigeoka argued the time was not right because Japan had no tariff 
autonomy. The so-called “unequal treaties” it was forced to sign with European powers 
and the U.S. in the 1860s limited its ability to set tariff rates on imports. He also argued 
that, even if going on gold would allow Japan to borrow at lower rates, these rates would 
only be temporary: the fall in exports to gold countries (due to leaving silver) would 
cause foreign investors to lower their assessment of Japan’s growth rate and, in the end, 
result in Japan having to borrow at higher rates.
20 
Despite this opposition, Matsukata and his allies prevailed by forging strategic 
alliances with other political parties. In particular, when Matsukata formed the cabinet in 
September 1896, he offered the post of Foreign Minister to Shigenobu Okuma, the leader 
of the Progressive Party (another large political party in Japan). While not all Progressive 
Party members agreed with the government’s position, Matsukata and his coalition 
government brokered a narrow majority that proved sufficient to carry the legislation 
forward.
 21 The House Committee that was handling the legislation narrowly passed the 
authorizing legislation (14 to 12). The bill then cleared the House of Representatives and 
the House of Lords and was proclaimed law on March 29
th.
22  The new currency act took 
effect on October 1, 1997.  
 
Section III. Did Gold Standard Adoption affect Interest Rates? 
 
                                                 
20 Imperial Diet [1897] reprinted in Bank of Japan [1960], pp.129. 
21 For example, Ukichi Taguchi, a famous free market economist and a member of Progressive Party had 
insisted that Japan should move toward the bimetallic standard. He made speeches opposing to the gold 
standard and voted against it. 
22 Droppers (1898, pp.171-2) suggests that once the legislation came to the floor of the parliament, there 
was inadequate time to debate it, and legislators likely only had a hazy conception of the legislation’s 
importance for the economy. 13   
 
A. Hard Pegs and Sovereign Borrowing 
 
The legislative and committee debates provide an understanding of why some 
policymakers looked favorably upon gold standard adoption for Japan. Many of the 
arguments made by policymakers in the 1890s are quite similar to those who advocate 
fixed exchange rates today: the ability to tap international capital markets at lower rates 
of borrowing, reduced exchange-rate instability, and greater trade. We now turn to 
assessing the consequences of gold standard adoption in order to examine whether 
policymakers’ ex ante beliefs about the effects of the gold standard are consistent with 
realized outcomes. We begin with an assessment of the effects of gold standard adoption 
on sovereign bond yields. 
Bordo and Kydland (1995) provided an interpretation of the role of the gold 
standard as it relates to the literature on rules for policymakers. They argue that joining 
the gold standard tied the hands of the fiscal and monetary authorities of a country, and 
that such a monetary rule can serve as a credible commitment mechanism to solve the 
classic time-inconsistency problem (Kydland and Prescott, 1985). Government policy is 
said to be time inconsistent when a policy plan that is determined to be optimal and to 
hold indefinitely into the future is subsequently revised. For example, suppose that a 
government sells debt to finance a war. From an ex ante perspective, it is optimal for the 
government to service its debt obligations. However, once the bonds have been sold, it is 
optimal for the government to default unless there is a commitment mechanism that ties 
the hands of the fiscal and monetary authorities. In the absence of a commitment 
mechanism, it is time inconsistent for the government to repay its debt obligations. 14   
 
Private agents will anticipate the government’s incentive to default and they will not buy 
bonds, forcing the government to rely on taxes or money creation. Overall, the existence 
of an enforcement mechanism, such as a credible threat to deny the government access to 
borrowing in the future, means that a socially optimal, but time inconsistent policy of 
borrowing can be supported as an equilibrium outcome.  
Bordo and Kydland (1995) also argue that the gold standard had an escape clause. 
Countries could suspend specie convertibility in the event of a war or a fiscal emergency; 
however, after the war or extraordinary event, it was well understood that a country 
would return to specie convertibility at the pre-war parity. Generally, resumption 
occurred after a “reasonable” delay period during which a country would impose 
deflationary policies to retire fiat currency printed for war finance. The United States and 
France, for example, fought wars in the 1860s and 1870s and issued large amounts of 
irredeemable paper currency and debt. Following the end of the war, both countries 
imposed deflationary policies to restore convertibility following the cessation of 
hostilities, and both had returned to a specie standard by 1880. Bordo and Kydland 
(1995) conclude that the gold standard was a contingent rule with an escape clause. 
 
B. Evidence on Japanese Sovereign Debt from International Capital Markets 
 
One testable implication of committing to a policy rule such as the gold standard 
is that it should lower the cost of capital in international capital markets. Indeed, Japan’s 
adoption of the gold standard has been frequently cited as a canonical case of the 
potential beneficial effects of joining the gold standard. Sussman and Yafeh (2000), for 15   
 
example, find that country risk of Japanese debt on the London market, defined as the 
current yield on a long-term Japanese bond minus the yield on the risk-free British consol 
declined more than fifty percent (or approximately 200 basis points) when the country 
joined the monetary rule in September 1897. They conclude that “the gold standard did 
significantly reduce the perceived risk associated with Japanese bonds (Sussman and 
Yafeh, 2000, p. 442).” 
To carry out the empirical analysis of sovereign yield spreads, Sussman and 
Yafeh (2000) spliced the seven percent Japanese sterling bond issued in 1873 and paid 
off in 1897 with an unspecified long-term bond issued in 1897 or thereafter. They argue 
that this is the best approach for testing the effect of adopting the gold standard on 
Japanese yield spreads since “data on domestic bond yields do not exist for Japan until 
the beginning of the twentieth century” (Sussman and Yafeh, 2000, fn 9, p. 446). Their 
unspecified debt series that begins in 1897 is most likely the Imperial Japanese five 
percent bond of 1897 (fully redeemed by 1950) since it was the only debt issue actively 
traded on the London market that fits the time series plot shown in their paper. Figure 1 
graphs these two bond series, where we have spliced them together as in their article. 
Using the current yield on the seven percent sterling loan and the five percent bond issue 
that appeared on the London market in October 1897, there appears to have been a 
dramatic fall in interest rates. 
Unfortunately, there are several problems with splicing the two different bond 
series that cast doubt on using these to infer the behavior of interest rates pre and post 
gold standard adoption. First, the Japanese government retired the seven percent sterling 
issue in the first half of 1897 through a drawing and then sold new long-term five percent 16   
 
bonds that would be completely redeemed by 1950 in the second half of the year.
23 Japan 
had long planned to retire the bond issue in 1897, which means that the drawing had no 
connection with the country’s decision to join the gold standard except for the fact that 
the two events coincidentally took place in the same year (Ministry of Finance, 1904). 
Importantly, the redemption provisions of the seven percent debt issue placed a floor on 
interest rates of seven percent because investors knew that the bonds would be redeemed 
at par (where par=100) by April 1897. This means that the current yield provides little 
evidence about the Japanese cost of capital since bond market investors would 
necessarily take a capital loss if they purchased the seven percent bond at a price above 
par.  
Second, the Economist and IMM, two of the most important financial newspapers 
in London, reported very little trading activity in Japanese bonds between July 3 and 
October 23, 1897, the period when Japan joined the gold standard. This is because the 
holders of this bond issue were able to obtain a higher yield relative to short-term market 
interest rates given that the debt issue was so close to maturity. They had little incentive 
to sell the bond in the market. This again implies that little information can be gained by 
examining the yields of these two bond series at this time. In summary, combining two 
bonds with different maturities, one with a duration of less than a year and another with a 
duration as long as 53 years, is simply not an accurate method for measuring the effect of 
the gold standard on the cost of capital. It is particularly problematic when the bonds are 
                                                 
23 Bond markets investors were clearly aware ahead of time that the Japanese government intended to 
redeem the bond issue by April 1897. In the original contract at the primary issue in 1873, the Japanese 
government announced it would redeem the bond issue at par by 1897 (Ministry of Finance 1904, p.621). 
This information was reported in the Official Stock Exchange Intelligence (see Official Stock Market 
Intelligence, 1896, p. 215).  17   
 
spliced together in the same year that Japan was adopting the gold standard – i.e., the 
year in which we want to identify the “event.”  
An alternative to relying on flawed data is simply to use a single bond issue that 
was trading both before and after gold standard adoption. If one examines the Investors’ 
Monthly Manual, the five percent Consolidated Loan bond was traded on the London 
Stock Exchange around the time of adoption.
24 Not only is this bond quoted in London, 
but contrary to Sussman and Yafeh’s assertion that there were no relevant domestic bond 
issues, this bond was originally issued in Tokyo and actively traded on the Japanese 
market. It began trading in London July 1896 and had terms similar to the other bonds 
sold by the Japanese government on the British market in 1897. The Consolidated Loan 
bonds had a maturity length of 50 years and were callable after five years. The only 
significant difference between the Consolidated Loan and bonds sold by the Japanese 
government immediately after gold standard adoption was that some of the post-adoption 
bond was endorsed to be paid in sterling.
25 Matsukata’s (1899) book on gold standard 
adoption confirms the existence of this domestic Consolidated Loan bond (Table L, 
p.378). Figure 2 shows that, contrary to the assertion that yields fell after adoption, 
country risk increased. In March 1897, the Consolidated Loan Bond traded at the average 
price of 105.5 pound with par value of 100 pounds. After the proclamation of the gold 
standard, the price dropped month by month to 95.875 pounds in August. In October, the 
price rebounded a little to 99.25 pound, but then continued its decline. It traded at 97 
pound in December 1897.  
 
                                                 
24  This bond listed in the IMM as the “92-3-5 red” bond. 
25 Financial History of Meiji-Era, vol.8, National Debts (1904, p.837). 18   
 
C. Evidence on Japanese Sovereign Debt from the Domestic Bond Market 
 
As we have indicated, previous scholarship has denied the existence of domestic 
bond issues during our sample period. Contrary to this assertion, this section presents 
evidence that an active and liquid market for domestic government bonds existed, and 
that prices and yields of these bonds can be used to clarify further whether Japan’s 
adoption the gold standard had any effects on its borrowing costs.   
  From 1870-1896, the Japanese government issued seventeen bonds in the 
domestic market and two in the London Market. Although the Japanese government 
issued its first sovereign bond in London in 1870, it issued bonds in the domestic markets 
beginning as early as 1872. Beginning in the early 1870s, traditional money changers and 
pawnbrokers intermediated trades of government bonds over the counter, and as early as 
1874-75, informal multilateral trading markets emerged in Tokyo.
26 At this point, the 
government decided to establish official stock exchanges in financial centers such as 
Tokyo and Osaka, and in 1878, stock exchanges in these two cities opened. The 
organizational structures of the Tokyo and Osaka exchanges were imported from Western 
exchanges, but many elements of day-to-day operational procedures were adopted from 
the long-standing rice trading market based in Dojima.
27 From their inception, the Osaka 
and Tokyo stock exchanges listed both government bonds and company stocks. In the 
late 1880s and early 1890s, the Japanese securities markets grew in volume and trading 
activity. Non-financial private investors more than doubled their securities holdings from 
                                                 
26 Shimura (1980, p.29). 
27 For example, they introduced three-month futures based on what had been developed in trading rice 
futures  (Tokyo Stock Exchange, 1928, pp.2-3). 19   
 
1886 to 1896. Japanese non-financial private sector ownership of financial assets 
increased from 265 million yen to 536 million yen between 1886 and 1896.
28  
The holdings of Japanese securities were widespread during our sample period. 
Private investors, including merchants and landowners, actively invested in domestic 
securities, and held large portions of government bonds and company stocks. As of the 
end of 1896, non-financial private investors owned 160-million-yen of government bonds 
(44 percent of the total outstanding) and 354-million-yen of company stocks (93 percent 
of total outstanding), while financial institutions owned 84-million-yen of government 
bonds and 27-million-yen in equities (Fujino and Teranishi, 2000). Anecdotal evidence 
also suggests that merchants and landowners in the countryside as well as in the cities 
traded securities on an over the counter basis.
29 
The Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) served as the central market in Japan. This 
market appears to have been well integrated with the rest of the world. Comparing the 
quotations for the Consolidated Loan bond in the London and Tokyo markets in Figure 2, 
we observe that the movements between the debt series are nearly identical. The minor 
differences between the interest rates probably reflect the fact that yields from the 
domestic Japanese market are computed from the average monthly bond price, while the 
yields for the London series are calculated from end-of-month prices reported in the IMM. 
Nevertheless, the Johansen Maximum Likelihood Procedure indicates that the null 
hypothesis of no cointegration can be rejected at the five-percent level of significance for 
                                                 
28 In this section, figures of financial assets are from Fujino and Teranishi (2000). 
29 For example, see Nakamura (2007). 20   
 
the two interest rate series.
30  The two Japanese bond price series share a common 
stochastic trend, suggesting that the London and Tokyo markets were integrated.   
As of December 1896, TSE listed six government bonds, one municipal bond and 
80 company stocks. Included in these domestically listed issues were two long-term 
bonds that traded actively on the Tokyo exchange before and after the country adopted 
the gold standard: (1) the previously mentioned five percent Consolidated Loan of 175 
million yen that was sold at various dates between 1887 and 1895 and (2) the five percent 
War Loan of 125 million yen that was issued to help pay for the Japanese War with 
China in 1894-95. The two debt issues were to be redeemed in 1951 and 1910, 
respectively. Both issues paid interest in silver yen before the country adopted the gold 
standard in September 1897. After joining the monetary rule, the Japanese government 
began making interest payments on its domestic debt obligations in gold yen. This means 
that joining the gold standard could have also reduced exchange-rate risk, the risk 
associated with changes in the value of the currency, in addition to country or political 
risk. 
Figure 3 shows the current yield for the two Japanese bond series from 1887-1910.  
The two series are highly correlated and do not seem to significantly decline with the 
introduction of the gold standard. Indeed, Figure 3 suggests that domestic interest rates in 
Japan may have actually increased after the adoption of the gold standard.
 31 Simple 
summary statistics show that Japanese interest rates increased by approximately 30 basis 
                                                 
30 The estimated values for the λMAX and λTRACE test statistics were 15.20 and 17.12, respectively.  
31 Both the lambda max and lambda statistics indicate that the null hypothesis of no cointegration for yields 
of the Consolidated loan on the London and Tokyo markets can be rejected at the five percent level of 
significance. 21   
 
points in the six months after the country adopted the gold standard.
32 As a robustness 
check, Figure 4 shows the interest-rate differential between Japanese bonds and the “risk-
free” British consol. The interest-rate differential should help control for the effect of 
gold inflation that began in 1897-98. Again, the Japanese yield spread does not appear to 
decline with the adoption of the gold standard. 
The time-series graphs suggest that joining the gold standard did not reduce 
sovereign risk for Japan. To formally test this hypothesis, we use structural break analysis 
and follow the procedure developed by Zivot-Andrews (1992). This allows us to test 
whether adopting the gold standard lowered the level, trend, or level and trend of 
Japanese interest rates and yield spreads. We specify a ten-year window around 
September 1897, the date Japan joined the gold standard, to test if the adoption of the 
gold standard reduced domestic interest rates. We do not specify a breakpoint a priori, 
given that the pre-selection of a change point biases the results towards finding a 
structural break (Christiano, 1992). The null hypothesis of the Zivot-Andrews structural 
break model, H0, for a given time series process yt can be written as:     
 
(1)   yt = µ + yt-1 + et,           
  
where µ is the mean of a given time series and et is a white noise disturbance term. 
The three different alternative hypotheses, H1, can be written as follows: 
 
                                                 
32 Japanese interest rates increased by about 15 basis points in the six months prior to Japan joining the gold 
standard. 
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Equation (2) is a “crash” model that allows for a one-time change in the intercept 
at a break date denoted by TB. This specification captures a large drop in sovereign risk 
similar to the dramatic decline in Japanese interest rates found by Sussman and Yafeh 
(2000). Equation (3) is used to test for stationarity around a broken trend at TB. This 
specification allows for a gradual decline in sovereign risk if the “good housekeeping” 
effect of the gold standard is incorporated into interest rates over a long period of time. 
Equation (4) is the most general specification that allows for a change in the intercept and 
trend at TB. 
DUt is a dummy variable that captures the shift in the intercept and takes a value 
of 1 if t>TB. DTt is another indicator variable that represents the shift in the deterministic 
trend at time TB. DTt  is equal to (t-TB) if (t>TB) and zero otherwise. To control for 
serial correlation, we also included lagged differences of the dependent variable as 
covariates in the three models. The number of lagged differences employed in the break 
tests is selected on the basis of the Akaike Information Criteria (AIC). In each of the 
three alternative hypotheses, yt is assumed to be a stationary process with one structural 
break. The null hypothesis is rejected if the αt coefficient is significantly different from 
zero. 23   
 
The empirical results for the structural break tests of Japanese domestic interest 
rates and yield spreads are shown in Table 1. In all six regressions, the structural break 
test is not statistically significant at the five- or ten-percent level of significance. The 
absence of statistically significant results holds regardless of whether we allow for a 
change in the intercept, the trend, or the intercept and trend of interest rates and yield 
spreads. Only one of the breakpoints identified with the Zivot-Andrews test occurs within 
a few months of the introduction of the gold standard. Overall, and in contrast to what 
supporters of gold standard adoption argued, the empirical evidence suggests that the 
introduction of the gold standard did not lead to a significant decline in Japanese interest 
rates.
33  
  Finally, if adopting the gold standard was meant to improve Japan’s reputation in 
capital markets and allow it to issue more debt, the period directly after adopting gold is 
very revealing. Confident with the victory of the Sino-Japanese war and the introduction 
of the gold standard, the government floated a new ¥100 million bond issue in London in 
1899, but the debt issue met with tepid response from foreign investors. Less than 10 
percent of the primary issue was purchased in the London market. The Japanese 
government (with assistance from the Bank of Japan) responded by purchasing nearly 45 
percent of the issue, with the underwriters having to absorb the remainder. Japan had 
believed its credit rating, after adopting gold was “between Germany and Italy,” but 
according to Suzuki (1994) and Metzler (2006), it had overestimated its creditworthiness 
in foreign markets and later additional attempts to engage foreigners in purchasing these 
                                                 
33 We also tested Japanese interest rates and yield spreads for a structural break over the entire sample 
period 1887-1910. The results are reported in the Statistical Appendix. Again, we do not find evidence that 
the gold standard significantly reduced interest rates. We also are not able to reject the null hypothesis of a 
unit root in favor of a structural break model. 24   
 
bonds (including attempts by J.P. Morgan and Co., Baring Brothers, and the Rothschilds) 
were rebuffed by investors.  
   Furthermore, archival evidence suggests that if, anything, the reason why Japan 
issued little debt in the 1880s and early 1890s had more to do with fear of being 
colonized by foreign creditor governments than it did with not being on gold. For 
example in July 1880, Former Finance Minister Shigenobu Okuma and former Internal 
Minister Hirobumi Ito jointly proposed the establishment of “the specie bank,” which 
would be the Japanese equivalent of the Bank of England or the Bank of France. To this 
end, they proposed to issue a government bond which would be salable to foreign 
investors.
34 Internal Minister Matsukata strongly opposed this idea, writing in September, 
“We are now in a vulnerable position without having the independence of tariff and 
justice. If we depended on capital of foreigners, who are superior in knowledge and 
financial power, we should be in a big trouble even though we might see temporary 
inflow of specie. We would have nothing to do when Japan should be a country like 
Egypt, Turkey or India.”
35 Matsukata turned down the proposal, and two years later, as 
finance minister, he established the Bank of Japan, which was purely domestic.  
 
Section IV. How did Gold Standard Adoption affect Trade? 
 
  As identified by the parliamentary debates and the Committee on the Monetary 
System, policymakers also believed that trade would be impacted by the adoption of the 
gold standard, but there was considerable disagreement as to how it would affect trade. 
                                                 
34 Okuma (1880). 
35 Matsukata (1880). 25   
 
Some believed that maintaining the silver standard was beneficial to trade as it enabled 
Japan to sell its exports more cheaply to gold standard countries. Others argued that 
adopting gold would be beneficial for trade as it would lower exchange-rate volatility and 
transaction costs. Other policymakers noted that the gains from being on silver were 
transitory, based on a favorable silver-gold price that would not persist, and that going on 
gold would at least permit Japan to trade among a global trade network that was 
organized around gold and not silver.  
To test these three hypotheses, we estimate a gravity model of Japan’s bilateral 
trade flows during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. We collected data on 
bilateral trade flows between Japan and other countries from the Principal Trade of 
Foreign Countries of the British Board of Trade Statistics and from Japan’s Ministry of 
Finance, Annual Return of the Foreign Trade of the Empire of Japan. These two primary 
sources contain more than 800 observations on Japanese bilateral trade flows with 
twenty-six of its main trading partners for the years 1877-1912. The sample contains data 
on bilateral flows between Japan and countries from Asia, Europe, North and South 
America including: Australia, China, French Indochina, Hong Kong, India, Korea, New 
Zealand, Philippines, Siam, Straits Settlement, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, Russia, Turkey, Hawaii, 
United States, Canada, and Peru. 
A gravity model is a very simple empirical relationship meant to capture the main 
effects of trade: mass and distance. As in a standard gravity equation, mass (measured 
here by the size of countries) is proportional to trade whereas distance should vary 
inversely. Given that we do not have GDP estimates for many of the dyadic trade pairs in 26   
 
our sample, we use population as a proxy for mass which has been shown to have a 
correlation of nearly ninety percent with output estimates for the classical gold standard 
period (Mitchener and Weidenmier, 2007).  
We augment the gravity equation with additional covariates which are meant to 
capture other influences on bilateral trade. We include railroad track miles to proxy for 
the importance of transportation infrastructure in promoting bilateral trade flows. We 
include a dummy variable to indicate whether Japan’s trading partner is landlocked. 
Since some studies have indicated that war negatively impacts trade flows (Glick and 
Taylor, 2006), a war indicator variable is included to take into account the fact that Japan 
fought in two wars during our time period. The indicator variable takes on a value of 1 
when Japan was at war with China (1894-95) or Russia (1904-05). We also include a 
dummy variable to capture differences in trade policy. In the 1860s, the United States and 
most European countries forced Japan to sign “unequal trade treaties,” which in effect 
gave their exports the lowest tariff rates prevailing in Japan; but these countries did not 
reciprocate and grant Japanese exports the lowest prevailing rates in their markets. Hence, 
we code a Most Favored Nation (MFN) dummy variable two ways, depending on the 
dependent variable. If we are examining total bilateral trade, then the MFN dummy takes 
on a value of one for countries that forced Japan to sign a unilateral MFN agreement.
36 If 
our outcome variable is Japan’s exports, then the MFN dummy takes on a value of one in 
cases where Japan has a reciprocal MFN arrangement (or in Korea and China where it 
imposed unilateral agreements during our sample period).  
The basic estimation equations take two forms:  
                                                 
36 These unequal treaties were renegotiated during our sample period, and the unilateral MFN provisions 
were changed to bilateral agreements. (See Murase, 1976).  27   
 
 
(5) ln(BITRADEijt) = β0 + β1ln(RRiRRj)t + β2ln(PopiPopj)t + β3ln(Dist)ij + β4Goldij 
+ β5Silverij +β6GoldSilverij + β7SilverGoldij  + β7Warij,t-k + β7MFN1ij  + β8Lndlckij + εijt, 
 
(6) ln(EXPORTSijt) = β0 + β1ln(RRiRRj)t + β2ln(PopiPopj)t + β3ln(Dist)ij + β4Goldij 
+ β5Silverij +β6GoldSilverij + β7SilverGoldij  + β7Warij,t-k + β7MFN2ij  + β8Lndlckij + εijt, 
 
where i denotes a trade partner of Japan, j denotes Japan, t denotes time, k denotes lags, 
and other variables are defined as: 
 
  
•  BITRADEijt denotes the bilateral trade between Japan and country i at time t; 
•  EXPORTSijt denotes Japanese exports to country i at time t; 
•  RR is railroad track miles; 
•  Pop is population; 
•  Dist is distance between Japan and country i; 
•  Lndlck is a binary variable which is unity if Japan’s trade partner is landlocked; 
•  Gold is a binary variable which is unity if country i and Japan are both on the gold 
standard; 
•  Silver is a binary variable which is unity if country i and Japan both are on the 
silver standard; 
•  GoldSilver is a binary variable which is unity if Japan is on the gold standard and 
country i is on the silver standard. 
•  SilverGold is a binary variable which is unity if Japan is on the silver standard 
and country i is on the gold standard. 
•  War is a binary variable which is unity if Japan is at war with China or Russia  
•  MFN1 is a binary variable that takes a value of 1 if a trade power has imposed a 
unilateral most favored nation treaty on Japan and that is in effect at time t.  
•  MFN2 is a binary variable that takes a value of 1 if Japan has negotiated a 
reciprocal most favored nation treaty with a trade partner or if it has imposed a 
unilateral MFN on a trade partner that is in effect at time t. 
•  and ε is a well-behaved error term capturing other influences on bilateral trade.  
 
The coefficients of interest in equations (5) and (6) are β4-β7, and measure the 
network externality and competitiveness effects of monetary standards on Japanese 
bilateral trade flows. The gold and silver dummy variables, Goldij and Silverij, capture the 28   
 
network externalities associated with two countries belonging to the same monetary 
standard. If membership in the same monetary standard reduces transactions costs or 
exchange rate volatility, then the coefficients on the gold and silver dummy variables 
should be large and statistically significant. On the other hand, SilverGoldij and 
GoldSilverij measure the competitiveness effect between Japan and its trading partner 
when the two countries have different monetary standards (i.e., Japan is on silver and the 
other country is on gold or Japan is on gold and the other country is on a silver standard). 
The baseline for comparison for all dummies is paper or bimetallic standards. This 
relative price effect could be an important determinant of bilateral trade flows during the 
period 1885-1896 when silver depreciated more than 50 percent against gold.   
Coding the monetary standards in this manner is important for two reasons. First, it 
enables us to provide empirical estimates for the three political economy hypotheses 
described above. Second, some of Japan’s most important trading partners (China and 
Korea) were on silver, so understanding both the impact of being on silver and on gold is 
relevant for the political economy arguments as well as for properly quantifying the 
nature of Japanese trade in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
We estimate equations (1) and (2) with both fixed and random effects panel 
techniques, and include year dummies to control for annual shocks such as global 
financial crises and recessions. The fixed-effects or within estimator is equivalent to 
adding a complete set of country pair-specific intercepts to the estimating equation. 
While fixed-effects ensures that the estimation of  the betas are consistent, they may not 
be efficient. The random effects estimator can yield more efficient estimates, but it does 
not apply in as wide a range of circumstances as the fixed-effects estimator.  29   
 
  The empirical results for total bilateral trade are presented in Table 2. We first 
examine the arguments for network externalities – that being on the same monetary 
standard potentially reduced transaction costs and exchange rate volatility. Conditioning 
on other variables, when both Japan and its trade partners were both on the silver 
standard, bilateral trade received a boost of over 1,600 percent ((e
2.850-1)*100) relative to 
being on a bimetallic or paper standard. The silver-standard effect is statistically 
significant at the one-percent level in both the fixed and random effects model. When 
Japan and its trade partners were both on the gold standard, bilateral trade flows 
increased by approximately 83 percent. The effect is statistically significant at the ten-
percent level in the fixed effects models and at the five-percent level in the random 
effects specification. Hence, policymakers who believed that Japan’s trade would benefit 
from moving to gold, since other countries were also adopting gold, were in part correct; 
the network externalities of being on gold significantly boosted trade. However, the effect 
was considerably smaller than the benefit that Japan had previously received from being 
on the same monetary standard as silver countries. 
The competitiveness effects of monetary standards can be assessed by examining 
the coefficients for the silver-gold and gold-silver variables. Both of these coefficients 
have large positive and statistically significant effects on bilateral trade flows. When 
Japan was on the silver standard and its trade partner was on gold, total trade increased 
by 213 percent.
37 When Japan was on the gold standard and its trade partner was on silver, 
total trade increased by 542 percent. Hence, advocates of the silver standard were correct 
in emphasizing that Japan had received an enormous boost in its trade due to the 
                                                 
37 Metzler (2006) also suggests Japan saw an increase in trade when it was on the silver standard, although 
he does not provide a formal test as we do here. 30   
 
depreciation of silver when it was on the silver standard, but proponents of going to gold 
were also correct, although perhaps more out of luck than out of perfect foresight. Gold 
began to depreciate against silver at about the same time that Japan joined the gold 
standard. If Japan had remained on silver until 1913, it would not only have seen its 
competitiveness deteriorate, but it would also have lost out on the enormous gain in 
competitiveness from being on gold. Indeed, the point estimate for the gold-silver 
variable is also significantly larger than the gold dummy suggesting that the relative price 
effect was much more important than the network externality effect for stimulating 
Japanese trade. 
Contrary to the view that the timing of the adoption was pure coincidence, in the 
year following Japan’s adoption of gold, Droppers (1898, p.174) suggested that “there 
was a general belief in Japan that silver had reached its lowest point in terms of gold, and 
that…the chances of a further fall were at least slight, as compared to a rise. Therefore, it 
was urged, that if the yen could be fixed in gold at near its existing exchange value, Japan, 
having exhausted all the benefits of the silver standard, would crystallize them into a 
permanent advantage…From this point of view, Japan’s adoption of the gold standard 
was rather a shrewd attempt to solidify all the advantages she had derived from the silver 
standard, a form of insurance against future dangers, than any objection to the silver 
standard itself.” Droppers acknowledges, however, that if this were the chief motive of 
the Japanese government, they were incredibly secretive about it, as advocates of the gold 
standard did not mention it in policy debates. And, in contrast to foreign press and 
foreign financial investors which believed this might have been the motive, the Japanese 
did not write about this as a reason for gold standard adoption.  31   
 
The concern over relative prices in the parliamentary debates was made with 
respect to export industries. That is, policymakers were concerned that fluctuations in the 
gold-silver price directly impacted the competitiveness of exporters. They were less 
concerned with how they influenced the quantity of imports. Hence, in Table 3, we 
present gravity models where the dependent variable is Japanese exports to its trading 
partners (rather than total trade).
38 The coefficients for the gold-silver and silver-gold 
dummy variables both show large, positive effects on exports. This is consistent with 
what policymakers believed was occurring prior to 1897: Japan’s manufacturing exports 
were benefitting from the decline in the relative price of silver. With respect to the gold 
standard, the competitiveness effect (gold-silver dummy) has a much larger effect on 
exports than the network externality effect (gold dummy) – 700 percent versus 117 
percent, although the network effect is only marginally statistically significant (at the 13 
percent level). With respect to the silver standard, the network externality effect has a 
substantially larger impact on exports than the relative-price effect (1608 versus 322 
percent). 
In terms of our other covariates, distance from Japan has a strong negative impact 
on both total trade and exports while transportation networks (proxied by railways) seem 
to matter more only for Japan’s exports. Although population has a negative and 
statistically significant effect on exports, the unconditional correlation between (log) 
exports and population is positive, but not statistically significantly different from zero.
39 
The war variables did not significantly reduce trade in the different specifications. The 
                                                 
38 We also estimated tobit models for the export models to control for the fact that there were some 
observations with values of zero for exports. The basic tenor of the results for the gold and silver 
coefficients remains unchanged.  
39 When use a median regression model for exports, we find that population has a positive sign, but is 
insignificant at conventional levels of statistical significance. 32   
 
MFN treaties substantially boosted total trade by roughly 433 percent, but the effect on 
exports is not statistically significantly different from zero. Given the way we have coded 
MFN1 and MFN2, we can interpret these findings in the following way. The “unequal 
treaties” that Japan was forced to sign in the 1860s raised total trade by increasing 
imports, but the reciprocal agreements that Japan signed, and the unilateral treaties it 
forced Korea and China to sign, had little impact on its exports. 
 
 
V. Did the Gold Standard Create an Investment Boom? 
 
 
As mentioned in the legislative debates over gold standard adoption, one 
consequence of adoption might have been to facilitate industrialization and spur a 
domestic investment boom. Since we have already shown that bond spreads did not move 
in the direction that would support lower borrowing costs overseas, this section explores 
whether domestic investment increased after gold standard adoption. To examine the 
investment-boom hypothesis, we first gathered new monthly data on Japanese stock 
prices around the time of gold standard adoption from the archives of the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange. Based on data for stocks listed and actively traded on the Tokyo exchange, we 
calculated a monthly capitalized market index of 13 companies for the period 1895-1899. 
The index represents approximately 70 percent of the capitalized market value of the 
Japanese stock exchange.
40  If expected profitability of Japanese companies improved 
with gold standard adoption, then this should have been capitalized into stock prices, and 
our composite index should show an increase after the time of adoption. 
                                                 
40 Although it is possible that the increase in bilateral trade flows might have led to a surge in domestic 
investment, most of the firms included in our stock sample were involved in domestic finance and transport 
– railway companies building passenger railways. 33   
 
However, as Figure 5 shows, the pattern does not support the idea that the gold 
standard would cause an investment boom that would lead to higher profitability of 
Japanese firms. The Japanese stock market index increased in the beginning of the 
sample before declining more than 35 percent in the one-year period before Japan joined 
the gold standard. The stock market index then fell by an additional ten percent in the 
year after Japan joined the gold standard. As a robustness check, we also calculated an 
unweighted stock market index for the period. As shown in Figure 6, the unweighted 
stock market index declined more than 30 percent after gold standard adoption. 
Commentators noted that the decline in security prices reflected a general feeling of 
uncertainty in the business community following gold standard adoption.
41 
To more directly assess whether an investment boom occurred after gold standard 
adoption, we collected data on the investment-GNP ratio. We compared the average 
investment-GNP ratio for the five-year period before Japan (1893-1897) joined the gold 
standard with the five-year period after Japan joined gold (1898-1902). We chose to end 
the “gold standard effect” in 1902 since some scholars have noted that the Russo-
Japanese War (1904-05) enhanced the country’s international standing and credibility 
(Metzler, 2006; Sussman and Yafeh, 2000). The average investment-GNP ratio was 
actually higher in the five-year period before Japan joined the gold standard (17.1 to 16 
percent). As a robustness check, we dropped the value of the ratio for 1897 from the pre-
gold period (since Japan voted to join gold in March but did not formally adopt the 
monetary rule until September) and recomputed the investment-GNP ratio in the five-
year period before and after 1897. The investment-GNP ratio is slightly higher when 
Japan was on the silver standard than after it went on gold: 16.3 versus 16 percent. 
                                                 
41 Droppers (1898, p.177). 34   
 
Overall, the empirical evidence suggests that joining the gold standard did not stimulate a 




This paper argues that in order to understand the reasons why countries adopted 
monetary standards and the consequences they had on their economies, it is helpful to 
begin the analysis by considering the political economy of the adoption decision. Interest 
groups may not be aligned (as their objective functions may differ) and outcomes may be 
uncertain. Examining countries adoption decisions on a case-by-case basis, as we do in 
this paper, enables the researcher to design empirical tests that are based on the ex ante 
beliefs of policymakers and to measure the effects of adoption on multiple outcome 
variables.  
Our examination of the historical record suggests that a priori policymakers were 
split over of Japan’s decision to join the gold standard in 1897. Many influential business 
leaders, academics, and government officials emphasized that adopting gold as the 
monetary standard would significantly impact trade, but they disagreed over whether it 
would be beneficial or detrimental. Some, like Matsukata, argued that it would increase 
exports because other countries were moving to gold and that Japan would have less 
exchange-rate volatility and lower transaction costs if it too were on gold. Others argued 
that it would prematurely terminate the benefits of being on silver: the declining price of 
silver since 1870 had been lowering the relative price of Japanese exports and many of 
Japan’s most important trading partners were on the silver standard. Other policymakers 
encouraged Japan to adopt the gold standard for different reasons – that it would be 35   
 
perceived by markets as a move towards better institutions and would hence lower 
Japan’s borrowing costs. 
Using newly assembled data on interest rates, we show that Japan’s adoption of 
the gold standard did not lower Japan’s borrowing costs nor lead to a surge in domestic 
investment. Based on evidence from both international and domestic capital markets, if 
anything, there was a slight increase in the rates of borrowing after adoption. These 
findings suggest a major reinterpretation of Meiji financial history since previous studies 
had associated a reduction in borrowing costs with gold standard adoption. We show that 
Sussman and Yafeh (2000) not only used a flawed data series, but that they ignored 
evidence from other Japanese sovereign bonds that actively traded in financial markets. 
While it is theoretically possible that a hard peg can serve as a mechanism for solving the 
time inconsistency problem, the case of Japan does not appear to be the canonical case 
study of such a mechanism.  
Instead, Japan’s experience suggests that metallic standards had a much more 
significant effect on trade flows. Estimates from gravity models show that bilateral trade 
increased when Japan went onto gold. When we decompose this effect, we find that the 
largest boost in trade came from the competitiveness effect (the decline in the gold-silver 
price ratio) rather than from network externalities (the reduction in transaction costs 
associated with being on the same monetary standard as many other countries). Previous 
scholarship has not attempted to disentangle these two channels, so this finding helps to 
clarify precisely how Japan’s trade increased as a result of gold standard adoption. 
Our results also suggest that Japan received a large boost to its bilateral trade 
when it was on the silver standard. The effect appears to have been even larger than what 36   
 
was realized for Japan when it went onto gold. Nevertheless, Japan’s adoption of the gold 
standard proved to be fortuitously timed as the decline in silver prices reversed course at 
around the same time Japan made the switch to gold. Hence, one can conclude that if 
Japan had remained on the silver standard it would have necessarily foregone a large gain 
in the competitiveness of its exports (something that was not known to policymakers ex 
ante), and may have faced a declining benefit via network externalities as more and more 
countries adopted gold. The political economy approach that we have used to study 
Japan’s adoption decision has shed new light on the reasons for and consequences of 
adoption, and suggests a robust alternative to the cross-country approach that could be 
employed to examine the adoption of gold for other countries during the classical gold 
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Year Dummies YES YES
Observations 801 801
R-squared 0.42
Table 2: The Effects of Monetary Standards on Japanese Bilateral Trade, 1877-1912
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
42Table 3: The Effects of Monetary Standards on Japanese Exports, 1877-1912
 

































Year Dummies YES YES
Observations 790 790
R-squared 0.42
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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